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Annotation. Cross-border criminality, emerging hybrid security threats, such as terrorism, trans-
border organised criminal activity and most recently the COVID-19 epidemic situation demands 
efficient cross-border police cooperation and information exchange. To answer this need, various 
communication channels have been established to facilitate trans-border law-enforcement information 
exchange. The aim of this paper is to introduce the supporting and hindering factors of the two, most 
commonly used police information exchange channels, namely the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) and 
the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre (PCCC). The author tried to achieve this goal by introducing 
the relevant scientific theories and using them as a starting point for a qualitative study. The subsequent 
desk research and in-depth interviews helped the researcher to describe the current information exchange 
process, the hindering and supporting factors, the characteristics and main differences of the SPOC and 
PCCC information exchange process. 
Keywords: police cooperation, cross-border information exchange, SPOC, PCCC, EU. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border police cooperation and information exchange was probably never as 
important as it is today when hybrid security threats, such as terrorism, smuggling of weapons 
and goods, the changing form of radicalization, violence and organised crime are becoming 
more international and also in nature.1 Recognizing the importance of cross-border information 
exchange, different communication channels have recently been used to exchange information, 
the two most important of which are: Single Points of Contact (SPOC) and the Police and 
Customs Cooperation Centre (PCCC). 
There are 28 SPOCs within the EU. These are centralised departments, located at the 
central national level of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), whose task is to facilitate all types 
of cross-border police information exchange without geographical limitation. Field officers 
                                                 
1 Frontex, ’Risk Analysis for 2018’, 2018, p. 6. 
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(end-users) send their request to their national SPOC through the established chain of command, 
and this request will be forwarded by the SPOC to another SPOC. The speed of the information 
exchange is strongly dependent on the number of intermediate stations. The 64 operating 
PCCCs are located regionally in the border areas. The PCCCs accommodate LEA staff who 
exchange information to facilitate a rapid and direct information exchange with neighbouring 
countries. Field officers usually send their request for information exchange directly to their 
national colleagues employed by the PCCC, who hand it over to the counterpart foreign police 
officer. The answer is given in the same way directly to the PCCC staff, who can forward it 
to the applicant. This channel was created to exchange information between neighbouring 
countries, however a different interpretation of the regulations led to the use of the so-called 
‘chain request’ system, which allows the exchange of information with non-neighbouring 
countries by using intermediate PCCCs located on the route between the applicant and the 
requested country. 
The importance of information exchange among LEAs was recognised by various 
agencies and institutions in the EU2 3, yet personal experiences show that there are serious 
shortcomings in cross-border information exchange when rapid information is required in order 
to properly fulfil the police job. First of all, the choice of the above-mentioned channels depends 
on many factors, such as personal considerations, preferences for a certain channel etcetera, 
‘which are not consistent across and not even within the Member States’4. In practice, this leads 
to confusion and often field officers are unaware which channel to use for a particular 
information exchange. They choose the channel with which they are more familiar, or which 
provides faster responses, neglecting that channel which should be used according to the 
applicable rules. Secondly, the speed of information exchange via these two channels is a 
weakness. Nothing shows the need for rapid, real-time information exchange better than the 
existence of informal communication channels. This informal communication is based on 
personal relationships and networks and is widely used by enthusiastic LEA officers who want 
to receive a rapid answer about persons, documents, visas and passport stamps in order to do 
their job at the border or inland properly. I have also experienced that cross-border information 
                                                 
2 Frontex, p.1-3 
3 European Police Office, ‘Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment’, 2017. 
4 Doherty, R. et al., ‘Study on the Implementation of the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM) for 
Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation’, 2015, p. 6. 
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exchange is sometimes not initiated and therefore appropriate police measures are not taken 
when the field officers know there is no chance to receive a formal or informal reply rapidly. 
The aim of the research is to provide an insight into the process of information exchange 
conducted by the above-mentioned channels and to find out which factors are supporting and 
hindering the exchange. 
To answer these research questions, literature review and desk research were carried out, 
using the available open source documents and the results of earlier field studies. Desk research 
was followed by in-depth interviews to find a more detailed answer to the questions, to discover 
the current processes, and to provide insight into the supporting and hindering factors of cross-
border information exchange. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The definition of police cooperation and information exchange 
International police cooperation became vital in 1984, when two countries, France and 
Germany agreed to gradually eliminate the border control on the common border and transfer 
it to the external borders. One year later the Benelux countries expressed their willingness to 
join this initiative. The strengthening of police and customs cooperation was one of several 
proposed measures5. The so-called Schengen Convention6 was signed five years later in 1990. 
The convention lists the modes of cooperation, with Article 39 encouraging the police 
authorities of the Member States (MS) to assist each other in preventing and detecting criminal 
offences. SPOC and PCCC information exchange are conducted under the umbrella of this 
convention as a type of cooperation. The SPOC was created to facilitate all type of information 
exchange by ‘putting one police service in every state in charge of international cooperation, a 
single contact point strategy, therefore centralizing the process of police cooperation’.7 The 
creation of the PCCC was the answer to the emerging need for a less centralised and direct 
channel among neighbouring countries in order to help operational activities in the border 
                                                 
5 Zaiotti, R., Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers, University of 
Chicago Press, 2011. 
6 European Union, The Schengen Acquis, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000  
7 Weibel, D., ‘Police and Border Cooperation in Schengen: The Police and Customs Cooperation Center 
(PCCC)’,  Leiden University, 2016, p. 2.  
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areas.8 ‘They were tasked with rather modest functions, limited to support for local 
neighbouring police and customs stations in the border areas.’9 
Information exchange can be defined as the formal and informal sharing of significant 
and timely information between two or more parties.10 We can conclude from the academic 
literature, that information exchange can be conducted on three interrelated levels, namely the 
inter-personal, intra-organisational and inter-organisational ones.11 12 Even though there is a 
strong distinction between the levels, it is clear that these levels of information exchange are 
interrelated: Intra-personal information exchange is embedded in the intra-, and inter-
organisational information exchange and even further, the intra-organisational information 
exchange is embedded in the inter-organisational one. The levels should be connected to each 
other in order to create an efficient information-sharing environment. This theory is supported 
by another study, which states that weak internal coordination and inter-organisational 
information exchange can negatively influence cross-border information exchanges.13  
Besides the (inter)connection of the levels, efficient information-sharing requires 
adequate organisational-managerial, legal and technological environments, which are 
determined by various factors such as the Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 
organisational structure, culture and values, human resources, trust, leadership, rewards, self-
interest, legal instruments and regulations.14 15  
 
 
                                                 
8 Saloven M. et al., ‘Study on the Status of Information Exchange amongst Law Enforcement Authorities in the 
Context of Existing EU Instruments’, 2010, p. 70. 
9 Gruszczak, A., ‘Police and Customs Cooperation Centres and Their Role in EU Internal Security Governance’, 
EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security: Technology, Externalization and Accountability, 2016,  p. 172. 
10 Cater, B., ‘The Importance of Social Bonds for Communication and Trust in Marketing Relationships in 
Professional Services’, Management, 13(1), 2008. 
11 Mausolf, A., ‘Keeping Up Appearances: Collaboration and Coordination in the Fight against Organized Crime 
and Terrorism’, University of Leiden, 2010. 
12 Yang, TM. and Maxwell, AT., ‘Information-Sharing in Public Organizations: A Literature Review of 
Interpersonal, Intra-Organizational and Inter-Organizational Success Factors’, Government Information Quarterly, 
28 (2), 2011, p. 164.. 
13 Saloven M. et al., p. 83. 
14 Yang and Maxwell, p. 171. 
15 Dawes, S., ‘Interagency Information Sharing: Expected Benefits, Manageable Risks’, Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management, 15, 1996, p. 377. 
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FACTORS EFFECTING INTER-ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
Organisational structure 
In the literature two main types of organisational structure are distinguished: the 
bureaucracy and the adhocracy.16 17 Bureaucracy can be characterized by formalized and 
hierarchized structure, functional departmentalisation and by standardized regulations and 
procedures.18 Formalisation can be described as ‘the extent to which an organisation’s 
structures and procedures are formally established in written rules and regulations’19. 
Formalisation is often correlated with the ‘red-tape’, the presence of excessive, rigid and 
redundant formal rules or procedures that serve no noticeable organisational functions ‘and 
result in inefficiency, unnecessary delays, frustration, and annoyance’20. This formalisation can 
hinder and prevent action or decision-making. Researchers also argue that written rules and 
formalisation are positively related to psychical and psychological stress, the feeling of 
powerlessness and have a negative impact on innovation, openness to new ideas, motivation 
and job satisfaction.21 In the field of cooperation this limited opportunity for lower level 
initiative taking also ruins the motivation and interest of the individuals to conduct information 
exchange.22 All in all, centralisation and hierarchical structure hinder initiatives and actions for 
the exchange of information, as individuals lack autonomy and managerial approval is required 
in most decision making processes23, which strictly controls the information flow and exchange. 
In addition, specialization creates conflicting goals which can block inter-, and intra-
organisational cooperation.24  
 
                                                 
16 Gruszczak, p. 135. 
17 Mintzberg,  H ‘The Structuring of Organizations’ in Asch D. and Bowman C. (eds), Readings in Strategic 
Management, Palgrave, 1989. 
18 Argote, L. et al., ‘Knowledge Transfer in Organizations: Learning from the Experience of Others’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82(1), 2000. 
19 Rainey, H.G., Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992, p. 209. 
20 Bozeman B. and Scott, P., ‘Bureaucratic Red Tape and Formalization: Untangling Conceptual Knots’, The 
American Review of Public Administration, 26(1), 1996, p. 8. 
21 Arches, A. ‘Social Structure, Burnout, and Job Satisfaction’ Social Work 36(3), 1991, p. 202. 
22 Yang and Maxwell (n 12). 
23 Kim, S. and Lee, H., ‘The Impact of Organizational Context and Information Technology on Employee 
Knowledge-Sharing Capabilities’, Public Administration Review, 66(3), 2006, p. 370. 
24 Mintzberg (n 17). 
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Trust 
Trust is a crucial relationship building block, which is often ‘defined as a belief that one 
relationship partner will act in the best interest of the other’25. Both inter- and intra-
organisational trust influence cooperation and information exchange. The lack of trust among 
national organisations can seriously hamper cross-border information exchange. For example, 
a previous study has shown that a national authority refused to provide the requested 
information to the SPOC or to the PCCC because doing so would allow another national LEA 
to have access to the information.26 Although there is a lack of empirical testing of inter-
organisational trust models27, a positive relationship between the degree of trust and the will 
for information sharing seems to exist.28 This positive correlation can be experienced in the 
field of international police cooperation where mutual trust and personal relationships are the 
most compelling forces.29  
Trust can be developed and maintained by timely, reliable, and adequate information 
sharing and perceived fairness.30 Other factors that support inter-organisational cooperation and 
trust are mutual benefit, mutual bonding, predictability and conflict resolution. A good personal 
relationship between the managers must also be recognisable for the staff in order to have a 
trust building effect. Already established trust can be further strengthened with increased 
mutual bonding: when more colleagues trust each other, their relationship becomes more 
personal.31 
Reciprocity 
The anticipated reciprocity positively influences the individual’s attitude towards 
information sharing.32 Moreover, reciprocity plays an important role not just between 
individuals, but also between organisations. A positive correlation exists between the extent of 
                                                 
25 Wilson, D.T., ‘An Integrated Model of Buyer-Seller Relationships’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 23(4), 1995, p. 335. 
26 Saloven M. et al., p. 83. 
27 Adams B. et al., ‘Review of Interorganizational Trust Models’, Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information 
Center, 2010, p. 105. 
28 Dean W, Goldenberg I and Soeters I., ’Information Sharing in Military Operations’, Springer, 2017, p. 85. 
29 Hufnagel, S., Policing Cooperation across Borders, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 86. 
30 Bstieler, L., ‘Trust Formation in Collaborative New Product Development’, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 23(1), 2006, p. 56. 
31 Hufnagel, p. 86. 
32 Constant, D., Kiesler, S. and Sproull, L., ‘What’s Mine Is Ours, or Is It? A Study of Attitudes about Information 
Sharing’, Information Systems Research, 5(4), 1994, p. 400. 
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information sharing and the degree of reciprocal interdependence meaning that each 
participating organisation possesses information that others need and vice versa.33 
Consequently, some academic literature concludes that reciprocity promotes and stabilizes 
international cooperation.34 
Organisational values, norms and cultures 
Organisational values, norms and cultures also influence the attitudes of individuals and 
the collective actions regarding information sharing.35 Organisational differences, such as the 
diverse national systems, the different culture, the different geographical locations of the 
national services, the different division of police tasks result in a different structure of cross-
border information exchange. The cultural diversity creates misunderstandings and the ‘lack of 
synchronisation in the communication between police forces can hamper cross-border police 
cooperation’36. Intra and inter-organisational information exchange are positively influenced 
by an organisational culture that emphasizes mutual interests, shared goals.37 Researchers also 
found that the strong social network (informal social interactions and personal relationships) is 
also an important promoting factor.38 
Incentives and leadership 
Performance based reward or bonus system designed specifically to encourage 
information exchange motivates individuals to share information and thereby greatly facilitates 
information exchange.39 On the other hand, in general, non-specific incentive methods can 
create competition that hinder inter-organisational information exchange40, therefore, the 
importance of information exchange in performance assessment should be emphasised and 
assigned. 
                                                 
33 Travica, B., ‘Information Aspects of New Organizational Designs: Exploring the Non-Traditional 
Organization’, Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 49(23), 1998. 
34 Axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 128.  
35 Constant, Kiesler and Sproull, p. 410. 
36 Styczyńska I. and Beaumont, E.Z., ‘Easing Legal and Administrative Obstacles in EU Border Regions’, Case 
Study No.8, European Commission, 2017, p. 9. 
37 Bock et al., p. 87-111. 
38 Kim and Lee, p. 370-385. 
39 Willem, A. and Buelens, M., ‘Knowledge Sharing in Public Sector Organizations: The Effect of 
Organizational Characteristics on Interdepartmental Knowledge Sharing’, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 17(4), 2007, p. 581. 
40 Zhang, J., Dawes, S. and Sarkis,  J., ‘Exploring Stakeholders’ Expectations of the Benefits and Barriers of E‐
government Knowledge Sharing’, Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 18(5), 2005, p. 548.  
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The attitude of the leadership also determines the reward and bonus system. Resteigne 
and Bogaert found that ‘the style of the leadership can enforce the negative and positive attitude 
towards information exchange’41. An authoritarian leadership style can dissuade staff from 
developing a positive approach towards information sharing. Contrary to this, transformational 
leadership supports initiate taking and encourages staff to exchange information.42 
Staff condition 
The researcher argues that the conditions of the human resources also influence the 
exchange of cross-border information. The lack of staff can hamper cross-border information 
exchange, as the agency ‘may focus on urgent issues within its own organisation when the 
immediate benefits of sharing information cannot be foreseen’43. However, not only the 
number of staff, but also their knowledge plays an important role in order to exchange quality 
information. The lack of training courses for field officers and the lack of awareness could 
hinder cross-border information exchange.44  
Language 
In the field of cross-border information exchange, communication in a foreign language 
can be a major obstacle and cause complications for daily police cooperation.45 Insufficient 
knowledge of the foreign language significantly hinders cross-border information exchange.46 
Furthermore, the proficiency in a common language is a precondition of optimal information 
sharing as it makes it easier to understand the organisational culture, the information needs and 
it could also help to create social networks.47 
                                                 
41 Resteigne, D. and Van den Bogaert, S., ‘Information Sharing in Contemporary Operations: The Strength of SOF 
Ties’ in I Goldenberg, J Soeters and W Dean (eds), Information Sharing in Military Operations. Advanced 
Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, Springer, Cham, 2017, p. 58. 
42 Goldenberg I. and Dean, H.W., ‘Enablers and Barriers to Information Sharing in Military and Security 
Operations: Lessons Learned’ in I Goldenberg, J Soeters and W Dean (eds), Information sharing in military 
operations, Springer Cham, 2017, p. 251-267. 
43 Yang and Maxwell, p. 170. 
44 Council of the European Union, ‘Draft SPOC Guidelines for International Law Enforcement Information 
Exchange, 6721/3/14’, 2014, p. 15. 
45 Hofstede, G. et al., Coopération Policière Transfrontalière Entre La Belgique, l’Allemagne et Les Pays-Bas 
Avec Une Attention Particulière Pour l’eurégion Meuse-Rhin, Maastricht: UPM- Universtaire Pers Maastricht, 
1993. 
46 European Commission, ‘Enhancing Police and Customs Cooperation in the European Union COM (2004) 376 
Final’, 2004.  
47 Goldenberg and Dean, p. 251-267. 
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POLICY, LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
The ruling policies and the legal environment have an impact on the behaviour of the 
individuals and of the organisation, and therefore on the cooperation between the organisations. 
Stable and accountable legislation and administrative procedures can mitigate the risks and can 
enhance inter-organisational cooperation.48 Researchers argue that confidentiality and privacy 
should be supported by the legal environment in order to facilitate information exchange.49 
Clear legislation, regulation and policies are therefore fundamental to reduce uncertainties 
created by a difference in organisational culture, conflicting political and legal principles and 
competing values such as ‘privacy, system integration, security, and confidentiality, which 
constantly threaten to put restrictions on information sharing into inflexible legal forms’50. On 
the other hand, a rigid legal environment and policies that prohibit sharing sensitive and 
regulated information in domains such as public safety and security can create barriers to cross-
border information exchange and may hamper cooperation.51 In the field of cross-border 
information exchange studies pointed out that the requirements of different national legal 
systems, different data protection and privacy regulations, different interpretation of the EU 
law, secrecy and confidentiality issues are among the main hindering factors of cross-border 
information exchange.52  
TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Efficiency of inter-organisational collaboration and information exchange can be 
increased by the advancement of the ICT.53 An appropriate ICT environment can ensure shorter 
response times and better data quality.54 The ICT system supports information exchange if 
different systems are homogeneous, the system combines user friendly ICT applications and 
has a high number of users.55 The large number of different and non-interoperable databases 
                                                 
48 Zhang, J. and Dawes, S. ‘Expectations and Perceptions of Benefits, Barriers, and Success in Public Sector 
Knowledge Networks’, Public Performance & Management Review, 29(4), 2006, p. 433. 
49 Gil-García J.R. and Pardo, T.A., ‘E-Government Success Factors: Mapping Practical Tools to Theoretical 
Foundations’, Government Information Quarterly, 22(2), 2005, p. 187. 
50 Zhang, Sharon and Sarkis, p. 548. 
51 Gil-García and Pardo, p. 190. 
52 Styczyńska and Beaumont, p. 7. 
53 Zhang, Sharon and Sarkis, p. 548-567. 
54 European Commission, ‘Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation in the EU: The European Information 
Exchange Model (EIXM), COM(2012) 735 Final’, 2012, p. 12.  
55 Kim and Lee, p. 370-385. 
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and communication systems create duplications and hinder cross-border information exchange 
as it results in delayed responses.56 More databases and ICT systems make information 
exchange more difficult, therefore the homogeneity and interoperability of information systems 
should be improved according to the European Commission.57 The level of information 
security, the lack of secured communication channel and the old-style data transfer systems are 
other factors which can hinder inter-organisational information exchange.58 Ensuring access 
authorization, authentication, security and confidentiality are critical in the design of the ICT 
system.59 
A case management system which helps to evaluate, classify and disseminate the 
information originating from all channels and which has an interface to a secured 
communication platform, increases the efficiency of cross-border information exchange if it is 
accessible for the information exchange channels.60 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research should answer the question of how law enforcement agencies exchange 
cross-border information, what factors impede and support this process and how obstacles can 
be overcome. In order to understand the case study61, the process of cross-border information 
exchange and the influencing factors qualitative research strategy was chosen, desk research 
and in-depth interviews were conducted62. 
The desk research analysed the available open source data and documents in the field of 
cross-border information exchange, paying special attention to the organisational, legal and 
technological environments and the implications for information exchange. A content analysis 
was conducted to analyse the desk research. The data analysis was done by open coding, where 
the researcher broke down, examined, compared, conceptualised, labelled and grouped the 
gained data.63 The results of the content analysis of the documents were compared with the 
                                                 
56 European Commission, 2004. 
57 European Commission, ‘Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, COM(2016) 205 
Final’, 2016.  
58 Saloven M. et al., p. 84. 
59 Chau M. et al., ‘Building an Infrastructure for Law Enforcement Information Sharing and Collaboration: Design 
Issues and Challenges’, Proceedings of The National Conference on Digital Government Research, 2002. 
60 Doherty, R. et al., p. 48. 
61 Yin, R.K., Case Study Research Design and Methods, 5th edn, Thousand Oaks ,CA:Sage, 2014, p. 1. 
62 Bryman, A., Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 628. 
63 ibid 569. 
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results of the analysis of the semi-structured interviews. This offers the opportunity to view the 
results from a different perspective. 
Purposive sampling64 was used for the three in-depth interviews to find answers to some 
practical questions. Three semi-structured interviews with one representative of each channel 
and one field officer were conducted via Skype to receive in-depth information about the 
research topic and to collect complementary information to support the desk research.65 
Interview questions and informed consent forms were sent out to the interviewees two days 
before the interviews. The transcripts were elaborated anonymous and shared with the 
participants for a cross-check to identify possible misunderstandings. The thematic analysis 
technique was used to code the semi-structured interviews.66 The text was examined to 
conceptualise and categorise the information and the elaborated coding matrix helped to 
understand the data and the theories by sorting out the relevant information. 
Quality aspects were ensured during the semi-structured interviews. The auditing 
approach ensured the dependability. Within the framework of respondent validation67, the 
findings were shared with the interviewees ensuring the correspondence between the findings 
and the experiences of the interviewed persons. Each group and their viewpoints are represented 
equally in the research in order to ensure fairness. 
RESULTS OF THE DESK RESEARCH 
ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Culture 
Police organisational culture is different in each EU MS, which comes from the diversity 
of the socio-cultural-, historical backgrounds, education, mentalities, work traditions, habits 
and fragmentation of the law enforcement tasks and authorities. We can find countries with 
single police services with two police services and with more than two police authorities.  
Although the historical roots are common ‘neither police organisations nor their daily actions 
                                                 
64 ibid 418. 
65 Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A., Research Methods for Business Students, Pearson Education Limited, 
2008,  p. 320. 
66 Bryman, p. 578–581. 
67 ibid 391. 
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are uniform’68 in all countries. The police structure is centralised in some countries, and 
decentralised in others, some countries have single police force others have multiple.69 This 
structural and cultural diversity and their effect on cross-border information exchange was 
recognised by the European Commission, they emphasised the importance of  creating a 
common culture and common instruments in order to increase cross-border information 
exchange and cooperation.70 
The general framework of international police cooperation is characterised by the 
diversity of the above written national structures and by the regional police organisations and 
EU instruments. Therefore, the structure of cross-border information exchange and the number 
of used channels depends on the number of police entities in a country and the level of 
centralisation of these agencies.71 We distinguish two structures, the centralised and the 
decentralised one, depending on the general governing structure of the country. 
Work of the channels  
In reality, different units and services are dealing with different parts of law enforcement 
cooperation and information exchange in several countries and there are significant differences 
between the MSs regarding the responsibilities of the services. This complex legal and 
operational landscape formulates the need to establish a network of databases and creating a 
‘one window’ system by putting one police unit in charge of international police cooperation 
in each country. This has resulted in the creation of the SPOC. SPOCs can be found on the 
central national level. SPOCs are usually divided into several functional subunits, which are 
responsible for conducting different types of cross-border activities. This simple and uniform 
approach at the national level aims to ensure that all information exchange requests are dealt 
with efficiently.72  SPOCs are mostly operating 24/7, although this still does not mean a SPOC 
can immediately answer to requests especially if SPOC depends on other units which are not 
working round the clock. The work division is different in each country. In some countries the 
same staff exchange information on behalf of different agencies and also perform cross-border 
                                                 
68 Aden, H., ‘Convergence of Policing Policies and Transnational Policing in Europe’, European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2), 2001, p. 99. 
69 Bayley, D.H.,  Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, Rutgers University Press, 1990. 
70 European Commission, 2004. 
71 Saloven M. et al., p. 19. 
72 Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 32. 
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information exchange with other national LEAs, while in other countries the workforce is 
separated according to the channels and tasks.  The desk research shows that the SPOC seems 
to be one of the most efficient tools for cross-border information exchange, and that 
communication is easier and more efficient within the MSs which have a SPOC. 73 However, 
the application of the SPOC concept varies across the MSs and the created structures just partly 
comply with the ‘one window’ criteria.74 
Most SPOCs prioritise serious and organised crimes, although cross-border criminality 
embraces less serious offenses75. This and new challenges within the Schengen area needed 
a less-centralised information exchange channel at the internal frontiers, this has led to the 
creation of the PCCC. PCCCs are located regionally, they facilitate instant, direct and smooth 
information exchange with neighbouring countries, support the operational units in the border 
areas and help to make quick decision.76 The generally high number of cross-border 
information exchanges is usually not related to the most serious and organised crime, as petty 
and medium crime, illegal migration and public order related information exchange is 
conducted mostly by the PCCCs.77 The legal basis for the operation of the 64 currently 
existing PCCCs in the EU, is the Schengen Convention.78 As the convention regulates the use 
of the communication channel only to a limited extent, the contracting parties define the basis 
for their cross-border cooperation in bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreements. 
Given the lack of a commonly agreed legal framework these agreements are very diverse. This 
has created an opportunity for using the so called ‘chain-communication’. Chain-
communication let the non-neighbouring countries exchange information by involving the 
neighbouring, intermediate PCCCs and by omitting the SPOCs79. As a result, the information 
was eventually exchanged between countries which have never signed an intergovernmental 
agreement on cross-border information exchange. A ‘significant proportion of police 
information exchanges are believed to take place via PCCCs, which in many cases are 
believed to occur without the SPOC being made aware of them’80.  
                                                 
73 Saloven M. et al., p. 19. 
74 Doherty, R. et al., p. 50. 
75 Saloven M. et al., p. 70. 
76 Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 44. 
77 Doherty, R. et al., 51. 
78 European Union, Art. 39, 44. 
79 Doherty, R. et al., p. 58. 
80 ibid 51. 
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Choice of the channels 
Not only the differences of national structures, but also the variety of the nature of the 
exchanged information and the different legal backgrounds contributed to the creation and the 
wide choice and use of various information exchange channels. Different channels make ‘more 
difficult to know which channel, and what means of communication, should be used for the 
cross-border information exchange’81, and this sometimes leads to confusion.  
The choice of channel is partly regulated by EU law, in some cases the use of a certain 
channel is mandatory, but the choice of channel in other cases is up to the MSs.82 This seems 
to be supported by the Swedish Initiative83, as it states: MSs can choose any channels which are 
used for international LEA cooperation. Contrary to this, the Schengen Codex states that, the 
request must be sent to the central national agencies which are responsible for international 
police cooperation. If the requested authorities do not have the authority to compete the request, 
it should be forwarded to the competent authority. If the request cannot be made in good time 
using the central authority, it can be sent directly to the competent police authority. The central 
authority shall be informed by the requester about the request as soon as possible. The decision 
of the MS about which channel will be used in a specific case usually depends on the subject 
matter, the requested country, the level of confidentiality and urgency. However, the Manual 
on Law Enforcement Information Exchange states that the requester (end-user) has a significant 
autonomy in choosing the channel which is considered to be the most appropriate and 
efficient.84 Despite all these factors, the choice of channel depends on many factors, such as 
personal considerations, preferences for a certain channel etcetera, ‘which are not consistent 
across and not even within the Member States’85. Two important factors which influence the 
choice of channel are trust and knowledge, as police officers are more willing to use those 
channels in which they trust and with which they are more familiar. Countries recognised this, 
therefore various training courses are available in several MSs. Training on cross-border 
information exchange is offered to SPOC staff in all MSs, however this is not true in case of 
                                                 
81 Saloven M. et al., p. 53. 
82 European Commission, 2016, p. 6. 
83 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA’, 2006, p. 89.  
84 Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 55. 
85 Doherty, R. et al., p. 6. 
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field officers.86 In reality, staff lack adequate training, and the end-users lack knowledge of 
existing channels. 
The previously discussed unstructured choice of channel poses problems for the players 
and officers who are engaged in information exchange and poses a risk to the quality of 
information exchange.87 The unstructured choice also serves as a ground for sending requests 
via more communication channels, which causes duplications. This is not forbidden, as the 
manual on Law Enforcement Information Exchange allows one to send a request through more 
than one channel in exceptional cases, but this should be indicated to all channels. The change 
of channel and its reason also should be communicated to all parties.88 The SPOC plays an 
important role in avoiding duplication according to different MSs.89 Also, the national case 
management systems are efficient to detect rare redundancies.90 
In addition to the above-mentioned formal channels, informal communication, typically 
via personal contacts also plays an important role. The extent of the use of this channel is 
impossible to estimate, but there are cases where informal communication channels are used to 
receive the answer rapidly or to speed up the already ongoing information exchange.91 As the 
received information cannot be used in the judiciary procedure, an informal request is usually 
followed by a formal request at a later stage.92 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Several EU legal instruments emphasize the importance and create the legal background 
for the cross-border information exchange. Thanks to the ‘principle of availability’ rule 
introduced in the Hague Programme93, the information available for a national LEA should also 
be available to each MS LEA, which in practise means that the exchange of available 
information cannot be refused by a MS LEA. The programme also emphasizes the importance 
of border areas where closer cooperation and better coordination is indispensable to deal with 
                                                 
86 ibid 79–83. 
87 ibid 6. 
88 Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 56. 
89 Doherty, R. et al., p. 49. 
90 Saloven M. et al., (n 8) 99. 
91 Doherty, R. et al.,  p. 58. 
92 Saloven M. et al., p. 76. 
93 Council of the European Union, The Hague programme: Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the 
European Union (2005/C 53/01), 2005, p. 1. 
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crime and security threats.94 According to the desk research the ‘principal of availability’ is a 
goal that cannot be fully achieved due the existing differences between the national laws and 
technical systems, operational capabilities and the lack of interoperability.95 
The Swedish Initiative96 ensures that the same procedures be used for cross-border 
information exchange that is used within the national LEA. Exchange of information can only 
be refused for very few specific reasons. The ‘principle of equivalent access’ basically means 
that cross-border information exchange should not be more complicated or restrictive than 
information exchange at national level. The initiative also defines the time limit to provide the 
requested information which is 8 hours in urgent and one week in ordinary cases.  Desk research 
shows that only 11% of the requesters often use urgent requests, since 57% seldom use and 
32% have never used.97 These numbers suggest that urgency is not an essential aspect during 
cross-border information exchange. 
TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The current ICT systems are appropriate and help cross-border information exchange, 
but because of the lack of secured communication channels and in order to ensure privacy 
and security still a large proportion of information exchange is still done by using ‘old school’ 
techniques, such as postal mail and fax.98 To overcome these security concerns, some PCCCs 
started to use the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA)99. SIENA is a 
state-of-the-art platform which provides a secured and fast ICT environment for EU law 
enforcement agencies. It supports information exchange between MSs and Europol (within the 
Europol mandate) and it also facilitates bilateral data exchange between MSs (outside of the 
Europol mandate). Contrary to the PCCC, we could not find any information whether SPOCs 
are using SIENA for bilateral information exchange, although the suggestion to use SIENA as 
a default tool was already emphasised by the European Commission.100 
                                                 
94 Gherman, A.C., ‘Cross-Border Police Cooperation in the European Union’, Annals of University of Oradea, 
Series: International Relations & European Studies, 7, 2015, p. 212. 
95 Saloven M. et al., p. 36. 
96 Council of the European Union, 2006. 
97 Saloven M. et al., p. 38. 
98 ibid 84. 
99 More information is available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-
support/information-exchange/secure-information-exchange-network-application-siena, (accessed 12 March 
2020). 
100 European Commission, 2012, p. 10. 
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Most MSs have a large number of different databases and several national LEAs have 
different policies, legislation and authorization regarding the use and management of their 
databases. Furthermore, not all necessary databases are available in a timely manner or to all of 
the staff who conducts information exchange.101 Following the instructions of the SPOC 
guideline, several MSs also work with the case management system and its database which 
helps to evaluate, classify and disseminate the information originating from all channels and 
national authorities and which has an interface with SIENA and other platforms.102 
RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Organisational structure and culture 
The organisational structure generally supports the cross-border information exchange 
according to each interviewee, SPOC respondent furthermore added:‘Single law enforcement 
service, centralised control and the homogeneity of the structure is supporting the inter-agency 
information exchange, provides quality and timely answers’. However, prioritisation can create 
obstacles, SPOC respondents continued as ‘The police itself is doing multiple tasks, and 
sometimes information exchange has less priority than other police duties’.  
The organisational culture supports the cross-border information exchange and is 
evaluated by each respondent to be similar to its counterparts. However, the SPOC respondent 
stated that the culture ‘has not too much impact on the efficiency’, as their work is regulated by 
the legislation and therefore, they fulfil their tasks regardless of the similarity in organisational 
culture. 
Leadership and management, staffing 
All the interviewees agreed on the importance of managerial support in the efficiency of 
information exchange which is mostly manifested in the use of incentives and awards. No tailor-
made performance evaluation procedure is systematised therefore according to the respondents, 
managers are voluntary using the non-institutionalized feedback system to motivate the staff: 
The PCCC interviewees started to organise regularly staff meetings in order to brief his 
colleagues about the results of their work. ‘It’s worth as this is the biggest motivation, more 
                                                 
101 Saloven M. et al., p. 85. 
102 Doherty, R. et al., p. 48. 
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useful than the mostly administrative and unsupportive performance evaluation procedure’ 
(PCCC – respondents). A manager of the SPOC reported the same experience: the motivation 
of the staff and then the efficiency of information exchange will increase after the introduction 
of a feedback system. 
With respect to the management style interviewees stated that it is mostly open minded, 
but when new ideas or bottom up initiatives are conflicting with the current legislation, such as 
data protection rules, the managerial support decreases. 
In the field of staffing, on one hand staff-shortage, overwhelmed staff and fluctuation 
were mentioned as the most important hindering factors. On the other hand, all of the 
respondents agreed that the staff is professional, efficient and capable to conduct efficient 
information exchange. Training courses are regularly organised which help to gain and maintain 
the necessary knowledge. 
Personal relationship, trust 
The personal relationship between the counterparts can influence the speed of the 
information exchange, all interviewees agreed. Field officer and PCCC staff interviewees 
emphasised the importance of mutual interest, social bonds and personal relationships to speed 
up the information exchange process. ‘The biggest advantage of the PCCC is that the 
counterparts are working under the same roof which creates good personal relationship, this 
increases the speed of exchange. (PCCC - respondent) 
The representative of the SPOC on one hand stated that the personal relationship can 
speed up the information exchange, but the ‘mutual interest and reciprocity is not important, 
as our job is regulated by the legislation’. The information exchange will be done in an efficient 
way even in case of bad personal relationships or negative previous experience. Contrary to 
this, field officer and PCCC respondent emphasised the importance of the mutual interest, ‘I 
can see the differences in efficiency when our counterpart is not interested in a case’. One 
example was mentioned in the field of drug related requests between countries with different 
legislation, penalization (conservative-liberal): ‘More difficult to cooperate with them in this 
case.’ (PCCC - respondent) The trust and reciprocity are also important, the field officer 
emphasised. The loss of trust and the experienced lack of reciprocity permanently eliminate the 
informal channel.  
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All respondents believed that personal relationship can be fostered by joint operations, 
workshops, various team-building activities and social events. The SPOC interviewee 
emphasised: ‘the teambuilding activities with other countries are very useful, conferences help 
to improve personal relationships and settle problems’. The interviews showed that the staff of 
the PCCCs have more opportunity to conduct more diverse trust building activities with their 
counterparts than the others: ‘We are organising team once a year, celebrating birthdays, 
retirements on a monthly basis. In addition to the trust-building, these meetings are providing 
a huge opportunity to solve problems.' (PCCC - respondent) 
WORK AND CHOICE OF THE CHANNELS 
Interviewees unanimously agreed that the requesters have a relatively large freedom in 
the choice of channel: ‘The choice of channel is depending on the personal experiences of the 
requester’ (SPOC – respondent). PCCC respondent added: ‘If a police officer has good 
experience with the PCCC (s)he will use it mostly for information exchange.’ 
The SPOC 
All of the channels exchange information on persons and objects, but SPOC is the only 
channel which can be used for all types of information exchange. Regarding to the speed of the 
information exchange conducted by the SPOC, both the field officer and the manager from the 
PCCC stated that ‘the information comes quite slow’ (Field officer-respondent). ‘The SPOC is 
slower, not suitable for everyday needs. It happens we receive the same request which was sent 
to the SPOC weeks ago and left unanswered.’ (PCCC-respondent) However, they agreed on 
that the SPOC is the most efficient channel when complicated or confidential information 
exchange need to be conducted, or investigative measures are carried out. Another common 
case for using the SPOC is when the requested information is foreseen to be used in the court 
procedure. This request is usually preceded by the PCCC or informal information exchange and 
the SPOC ‘legitimising’ only the information already known, stated the field officer. 
The SPOC exchanges information without geographical border as its counterparts can be 
not only a neighbouring country but each EU MS and several third countries. Half of the 
exchange takes place with non-neighbouring countries and most of the exchange is complicated 
and requires more steps to provide answers. The exchange of information can be initiated via 
the command structure by mail or by specially designed e-networks. According to the SPOC 
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respondent, the added value of the SPOC is that, they ‘exactly know which channel is the most 
efficient for a certain request in a specific country, so we can save time and can ensure 
efficiency’. Same interviewee noted: ‘The use of a specific network is mandatory in some few 
cases, in this case the use of alternative methods is not allowed.’ Contrary to this, the field 
officer stated that practical considerations and experiences are more important during the choice 
of the channel than the text of the legislation. ‘Various factors shall be taken into 
consideration,’ he further explained, ‘such as the chance to receive answer in time, available 
manpower, operational and legal consequences.’ (Field officer - respondent) 
The PCCC 
‘The PCCC can conduct information exchange in 5-20 minutes, therefore it is a very 
efficient channel when fast and simply information exchange is requested from, as a general 
rule, neighbouring country’ (PCCC-respondents), interviewees from the field and from the 
PCCC stated. The information exchange is based on intergovernmental agreements, which 
provides flexibility. The area of responsibility usually covers the whole country but sometimes 
it is limited to the border region. Even if previously mentioned geographical limitation is in 
force, some PCCCs are allowed to exchange information out of their limited AOR as it was 
stated by the interviewee from the PCCC: ‘We can exchange information out of the border 
region we are not limited to the region, in this case we have only one restriction, the information 
exchange request shall be urgent.’ (PCCC - respondent) 
Recently PCCCs have started to exchange information directly with non-neighbouring 
PCCCs, with the staff of LEAs of non-neighbouring countries and even with the staff of Frontex 
operations who serve abroad: ‘We started to receive information, which is related to other, non-
neighbouring countries. We also receive requests directly from non-neighbouring countries in 
case the requester needs information from my country or from my counterparts. Direct contact 
also exists, we are receiving requests from foreigner (EU MS) police officer from the field and 
not through their PCCC.’ (PCCC – respondent) Field officer agreed with this, he stated: ‘I have 
a list about the PCCCs within the EU, I send them request regularly, sometimes I receive 
answer sometimes not, it is not consistent even within one PCCC.’ 
Furthermore, the PCCC information exchange with non-neighbouring countries can be 
conducted by using the so-called ‘chain of request technique’. The Swedish Initiative is used 
as a legal background when information exchange is conducted with non-neighbouring 
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countries. ‘If my country has no PCCC with the country from where I need the information, I 
can send my request to one of my national PCCC, who will use the chain of request or snow 
ball method, and will send it to the appropriate PCCC by using interim PCCC.’ (Field officer 
- respondent) The purpose of the chain of request is to eliminate certain legal problems arising 
from the nature of intergovernmental agreements, which are mutatis mutandis limiting the 
information exchange only to the signatory parties. In this case, the intermediate PCCCs only 
play the role of messengers and forward the request to the final PCCC destination: ‘If we receive 
a request which is not related to our country, we use chain request, but this is under 10%.’ 
(PCCC - respondent) 
Another task of the PCCCs is the facilitator role: ‘Several countries do not accept requests 
from countries which are not the parties of the bilateral agreements, in this case the request 
can be sent to that PCCC which is the member of the agreement and which accepts request 
from outsiders. This PCCC, based on the bilateral agreement will request the information 
exchange from its counterpart and when the requested information is received it simply 
forwards it to the original requester.’ (PCCC - respondent) The facilitator role is also used to 
overcome language barriers: As some PCCCs cannot communicate in foreign languages, the 
facilitator counterpart PCCC can be used to translate the request and to forward it to the target 
PCCC, stated the PCCC – respondent. This statement was supported by the field officer 
respondent also.  
The informal channel 
As a result of the complications introduced above, the use of informal channels has been 
increased, according to the field officer: ‘As the official channels are simply incapable to 
provide the necessary answers such a short time, we have basically two options: using informal 
channels or not using them, and despite our suspicion, let him or her cross the border and enter 
or exit the EU, but honestly saying to let somebody crossing the border with e.g. fake passport 
is a security risk.’ 
Informal channels are used when something is suspicious, but the available information 
is not adequate to create well-grounded suspicion and the officer has only a few, maximum 
fifteen minutes to decide what actions must be taken. An informal request is usually followed 
by an official request in case of a positive answer and when further action is needed. According 
to the field officer ‘informal channels, trust and maintain trust have an utmost importance. 
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Mutual interests make me to use informal channels.’ Trust originates from previous work 
experiences, joint activities, conferences, workshops, common workplaces etc. Closed 
messenger groups or phone are used for informal information exchange. Informal channels are 
not used by the staff of the PCCC and the SPOC, we learned from the interviews. 
Parallel channels 
Parallel channels are mostly used by the field officers to get timely response. ‘As one case 
management system is used, parallelism is immediately spotted’, said the PCCC respondent. 
Contrary to this the interviewee from the SPOC said that: ‘The duplications cannot be identified 
automatically because of the lack of a common case management system with the police’. 
Therefore, the duplication can only be detected manually which is really time consuming. 
Duplication that is signalled in time does not hinder the information exchange, as only one 
request will be answered. Increased workload only occurs when parallelism is not noticed and 
both channels work on the same request. ‘We are not using more channels frequently, just if 
one channel is not responding or acting’, was said by the SPOC interviewee. 
LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Legislation influences the efficiency of the information exchange and data protection 
regulation hinders the exchange of information each respondent agreed. The EU legislation 
makes the system inflexible, the ‘Interpretation of the legislation, bilateral agreements are 
different by the PCCCs even sometimes by the staff within one PCCC, which can block the 
information exchange’ (PCCC - respondent). As it was mentioned before by the representative 
of the PCCC, this rigidity can be absorbed by intergovernmental agreements, in this case ‘the 
Schengen regulation and the Swedish Initiative which complicates the information exchange 
can be neglected’ (PCCC – respondent). Contrary to the opinion of the PCCC and field officer 
interviewees, the SPOC respondent stated that the legislation is not strict, it ‘provides flexibility 
and thanks to this the ruling regulations do not hinder the information exchange’. 
Finally, in the area of the technological environment, everyone agreed on the importance 
of interoperability: ‘If the systems are interoperable it really can speed up the process.’ (SPOC 
- respondent) The availability of various databases can also increase the efficiency we learned 
from the PCCC and the field officer respondents, one said: ‘We need more access to more 
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databases. We need access to all EU databases if we want to work for a safer EU.’ (PCCC – 
respondent).  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three main environments have an impact on the exchange of cross-border information, 
such as the organisational/management, legislation/policy and the ICT environment. The 
supporting and hindering factors can be integrated into this concept, in these environments. 
Firstly, the highly centralised organisational structure, ‘red-tape’ bureaucracy and 
authoritarian leadership style, lack of institutionalised reward and feedback system, weak 
internal coordination, diverse organisational cultures, internal and external competition, lack of 
trust and reciprocity and the overwhelmed staff are among the most important organisational 
obstacles in the field of cross-border information exchange found in this study. However, the 
organisational structure and culture, the quality of the staff generally supports the cross-border 
information exchange. Researcher found that, the international police cooperation varies with 
the organisational structure of the national services, by the regional constellations and 
relationships and by the ruling EU instruments. Therefore, the cross-border information 
exchange process, the use of the channel is not consistent, it highly depends on the number of 
the police entities in a country, the level of centralisation, the ruling policies, legislation and the 
ICT environment. It also can be concluded that the choice of channel is unstructured, it depends 
on personal experiences, knowledge and trust towards a certain channel. When the official 
channel is passive or slow, the rules are sometimes violated by using informal networks. The 
existence and use of the informal channels indicate that there are significant disadvantages of 
the official channels, which are mainly reflected in the speed of the information exchange 
process. However, the existing good personal relationship between the counterparts, trust, 
mutual interest and the reciprocity can contribute to a faster exchange. 
Secondly the legislative environment (various requirements of the national legislations, 
differences in data protection and classification rules and uncertainty about which information 
can be provided by a country) slows down the information exchange and poses a threat to the 
efficiency of cross-border data exchange. The lack or inappropriate harmonisation of the EU 
instruments and the different national interpretations are also hindering factors found in this 
study. 
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Third, the obsolete or different levels of the ICT system, the lack of interoperability and 
compatibility and finally the proliferation of various national databases can cause delayed 
responses, and this has a negative impact on the efficiency. Another problem is the lack of a 
commonly used case management system and the lack of secure communication channels that 
ensure the enforcement of the required rules on data protection and confidentiality in the 
exchange process. 
Based on the research results and the identified gaps one of our most important 
suggestions is to create a unified and harmonized legal background for the cross-border 
information exchange and to equip all channels to be able to conduct fast cross-border 
information exchange. Also, acknowledging that the speed is a big advantage of the PCCC in 
the information exchange, at first the legal base should be created which ensures a 
geographically unlimited cross-border information exchange for this channel. Furthermore, the 
management must be aware of the importance of supporting, transformational leadership in the 
efficiency of the information exchange, which can be ensured by organizing managerial training 
courses. Management could introduce a tailor-made incentive system and provide appropriate 
feedback. Next, interoperability should be ensured to increase the speed of the channels. User 
friendly and advanced ICT system should be created which support rapid and secured 
information exchange. Access to the EU databases should be granted to the channels and to the 
field officers so that they can respond automatically to certain requests. Finally, in order to 
avoid duplication and to decrease the unnecessary workload of channels, a case management 
system should be set up to identify parallel requests. 
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